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WHY WOMEN HAVE LOWER RETIREMENT SAVINGS: THE AUSTRALIAN CASE 
 
Jun Feng, Paul Gerrans, Carly Moulang, Noel Whiteside, and Maria Strydom 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study provides empirical evidence of the gender gap in retirement savings trajectories using 
a large longitudinal Australian database. The persistent trend of retirement income policy over 
recent decades has been to place responsibility for retirement savings accumulation with the 
individual employee. These plans are fundamentally linked to employment conditions and 
individual choices, which shape retirement savings trajectories and outcomes. Australia has a 
mature compulsory system and thus provides insight for countries embarking on similar paths. 
This study shows that the gender gap in retirement savings is observable from early on in an 
individual’s paid working life and persists over time, providing evidence that women are 
disadvantaged early in their careers, with few signs of improvement. Men, in contrast, are 
overrepresented in the upper quartile of growth in retirement savings. This study provides 
important empirical evidence for policymakers concerned with gender differences in retirement 
outcomes. 
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Gender inequality, pensions, social policy 
 
JEL Codes: D14, D31, D63 
 
RUNNING HEAD: WHY WOMEN HAVE LOWER RETIREMENT SAVINGS 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The financial consequences of retirement savings policies are different for men and women in 
terms of financial outcomes, and these differences are reflective of both explicit and implicit 
design features. A 2005 special issue in Feminist Economics on gender and aging focused, 
among other things, on the gendered differences in the economic resources available for 
retirement (Folbre, Shaw, and Stark 2005). The extent and nature of gender differences in 
retirement savings outcomes – that is, the gender pension gap or the “other” gender wage gap 
referred to as the “superannuation accumulation gap” (Jefferson and Preston 2005) – is the focus 
of this paper, and it appears that little has changed in terms of positive outcomes for women in 
the time since that special issue. Retirement savings trajectories – meaning, the pattern of 
accumulation – continue to differ for women in comparison to men. The aim of our study is to 
empirically examine the retirement savings gap as a consequence of labor market forces. Our 
analysis focuses on the gender differences in savings contributions profiles, which are linked to 
employment and the profile of interruptions of contributions resulting from the labor market.  
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In doing so, we reveal and explain why women’s savings persistently fall behind men’s, 
with specific reference to different age cohorts, levels of income, and career trajectories. Our 
analysis is grounded in an empirical examination of Australian data where compulsory, 
employment-based retirement savings, known as superannuation, was made universal and 
mandatory in 1992. Employers must currently contribute 9.5 percent of salary (to rise to 12 
percent by 2025) for each employee earning over AU$450 gross per month. With only a few 
exceptions, these contributions are paid to defined contribution (DC) schemes. Fiscal incentives 
encourage additional superannuation savings, which accrue disproportionately to those with 
higher incomes. Superannuation savings are “preserved” and can be accessed from age 60 tax 
free, once retired.1 The superannuation system runs parallel with a tax-funded, means-tested, 
state-run age pension scheme from age 65.5 years, increasing to 67 years by 2023.  
Most research on the issue of pension inequality relies on cross-sectional surveys, which 
offer repeated historical snapshots over time. This type of data has its limitations, particularly the 
inability to carefully follow specific cohorts over time. We employ data derived from a fund and 
use a large sample from a cross-section of Australian paid workers (21,499 members, 37 percent 
women) over a ten-year period, which allows individual age cohorts to be tracked over time to 
estimate cumulative effects on retirement savings. Our access to longitudinal data allows insight 
to what has changed over a ten-year period to build on the work of Therese Jefferson and Alison 
Preston (2005), who relied on projections to underpin their research, and the work of Sara 
Fernández-López et al. (2015), who documented gender differences in European retirement 
savings and advocated for longitudinal evidence. Our empirical results contribute to the growing 
interest in investigating the factors contributing to the gender gap in retirement savings 
(Australian Human Rights Commission [AHRC] 2016) and provide detailed longitudinal 
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evidence of how the retirement savings gap, which has been well-documented in a broad sense 
(Senate Economics References Committee [SERC] 2016), is realized across age cohorts over 
time as a consequence of the gender gap in the labor market. 
Improved life expectancy and growing fiscal pressures have encouraged governments in 
developed economies to promote policies based on greater mutual obligation with funded private 
pensions to supplement state-run schemes. Rising public debt following the 2007 global financial 
crisis (GFC) has shored up official resistance to any increase in public liability for pensions and 
reinforced the move to DC schemes as a consequence. Here, retirement income is based on the 
amount saved on the individual’s behalf (plus any interest earned) over a lifetime of paid work. 
The growth of privately funded pensions in general, and DC schemes in particular, increases the 
importance of waged work as a basis for personal saving for retirement. Adoption of privately 
funded pensions tends to benefit higher earners (typically men) and disadvantage women 
(Orenstein 2011). This creates problems as, while women’s labor market participation rates have 
improved in recent decades, the gender participation gap in the labor market remains more than 
10 percentage points in the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States and 12 
percent in Australia (OECD et al. 2014). In Australia, the “modified male breadwinner” model is 
said to dominate (Hill 2007), which describes households in Australia as continuing to position 
women as being primarily responsible for family-care roles in which women’s income is 
positioned second, or marginal, compared to male household earners (Broomhill and Sharp 
20045; Hill 2007). Stay-at-home fathers (mothers), for example, comprise 4 (31) percent of two-
parent families (Baxter 2017). Although aggregated statistics indicate that Australian women 
have increased their economic participation (Greig et al. 2006), careful analysis of these statistics 
indicate that this has resulted from increased participation by women in “part-time, low paid and 
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precarious jobs” (Barns and Preston 2010: 81). The nature of this type of employment can lead to 
suboptimal outcomes, such as reduced promotional opportunities, employment insecurity, and 
low superannuation accumulation. As future retirement income levels and distribution 
increasingly depend on personal savings, which is in turn linked to wages, the gender gap in 
retirement savings is expected to reflect past employment-based inequalities within the labor 
market. The pension gender gap mirrors “cumulated disadvantages of a career spent in a gender-
biased labor market,” which “is even more true for older cohorts” (Bettio, Tinios, and Betti 2013: 
7). While a gender-biased labor market evidently also shapes pension rights based on earnings-
linked social security (as found in the US, some Latin American countries, and many continental 
European schemes), our principal focus here remains on personal funded pensions, specifically 
compulsory, employment-based retirement savings.  
In this context, the size of the gender gap in retirement savings, along with its dimensions 
and trends, emerge as empirical questions. The retirement savings gap is a function of not only 
the gender bias in the labor market but also gendered savings patterns (which again are labor 
market influenced), education levels, and care obligations, which have been deemed “care 
penalties” (Folbre 2017). The extent to which women save may mitigate the retirement savings 
gap over time, but the ability to save and the amount saved may be reduced for those affected by 
the gender pay gap in the labor market. US studies find that while the pay of low-skilled women 
(those not completing high school) do not appear to fall further behind men following family 
formation, the same is not true for highly skilled (college-educated) mothers (Anderson, Binder, 
and Krause 2002, 2003). Issues of unwaged family care and its propensity to recast career 
trajectories for middle-class women thus influence the size of pension gender gaps. Further, 
recent trends toward equal labor market activity between men and women may prove permanent. 
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Recent US evidence shows that younger cohorts (18 years) display a greater affiliation to 
gendered working role models (male breadwinner, female domestic carer) than they did twenty 
years ago (Donnelly et al. 2016), thereby throwing into question the assumption that younger 
female cohorts will, in the future, continue to work for pay while raising a family. Lack of 
support for gender equality within the home has also been found cross-culturally in nations with 
more economic and educational opportunities for women, favoring more traditional attitudes 
within the home (Yu and Lee 2013). Discrepancies in labor market participation appear likely to 
continue, generating gender imbalances to undermine the political and economic viability of 
funded pension settlements. The ability to accommodate the issue of unwaged care attributed 
mainly to women is particularly central to the success of the transition toward funded old-age 
income security for all. While there is clearly complexity in the contributing factors that lead to a 
gender gap in retirement savings, the current study focuses specifically on the impact of the 
gender gap in the labor market.  
 
 
THE LABOR MARKET AND THE GENDER PENSION GAP: AN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
Considerable academic research has been devoted to analyzing women’s disadvantages in the 
labor market: disadvantages derived from occupational segregation in low-paid work, broken 
careers, and part-time jobs. The gender pay gap is also well documented (Weichselbaumer and 
WinterEbmer 2005; Morton et al. 2014; Blau and Kahn 2016; Olivetti and Petrongolo 2016). A 
generalization to pensions might appear to be a natural extension, but this topic has received 
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comparatively less attention – although some authors in the retirement savings literature have 
pointed out how these gendered disadvantages coupled with household structures impact public 
and private systems (Cebulla, Butt, and Lyon 2007; Clark and Strauss 2008; Meyer and Bridgen 
2008; Van Dalen, Henkens, and Hershey 2010). The pension gender gap is evident and is often 
larger than the gender pay gap. For the EU as a whole, the gender gap in pensions is more than 
double the gender gap in pay (39 percent for pensions, 16 percent for pay; Bettio, Tinios, and 
Betti 2013). Less consistent are the findings on the trend of gender-based pension gaps where 
longitudinal analysis is conducted. Judith Flory (2012) estimates the gender pension gap to have 
reduced from 69 percent in 1992 to 60 percent in 2007 in Germany, while the European 
Commission (2013) identifies an overall widening of the gap in Europe between 2005 and 2010 
of 1.7 percentage points, though this may fall within a margin of error and mask opposing trends 
across countries. The mixed findings, howev r, partly reflect the retirement income measures 
used (meaning, all retirement income versus DC-type personal savings only). 
Reviewing the evolution of gender pension gaps over a thirty-year period in the US, 
William E. Even and David A. Macpherson (2004) conclude that improved gender balance in the 
labor market does not translate into gender equality in pensions. Tom Sefton, Maria Evandrou, 
and Jane Falkingham (2011) analyzed family history impacts on current pension outcomes for 
British retired women and suggest that previous employment is not a determining factor since 
women’s pension rights relied on the spouse or the state as previous low-paid and/or part-time 
jobs did not offer any cover. Paid work linked to personal pension systems often increases the 
penalty of caring: a conclusion that can be extended to all undertaking unwaged care (Evandrou 
and Glaser 2003; Folbre 2017). Research tracking individual histories reveals the detrimental 
consequences of missing contributions in DC schemes in the early years of pension saving. 
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Simulations show how a five- or six-year labor market absence to raise children creates a 17–25 
percent drop in final DC savings (Rice Warner 2014; Scottish Widows 2015). This cannot be 
compensated by extra “catch-up” contributions before retirement, as accumulated compound 
interest on money put aside for prolonged periods is lost (Drew et al. 2014). In addition, 
retirement planning is often viewed as a household (joint) decision, and women’s pension 
expectations are statistically significantly lower than men’s (Van Dalen, Henkens, and Hershey 
2010). Hence, private sector pension gaps are widest for married women, with strong 
relationships between family size and pension outcomes (Parr, Ferris, and Mahuteau 2007); and 
divorced older women are particularly vulnerable to old age poverty if they fail to secure a share 
of their spouses’ pensions. 
The “care penalty” (Folbre 2017) is central to any analysis of gendered pension gaps. In 
reviewing over one hundred research publications on the pension consequences of unwaged care, 
Therese Jefferson (2009) identifies three main policy strategies designed to protect women in 
retirement. The first, promoting women’s full-time paid work, is characterized by the Nordic 
countries. Earnings-related benefits, funded parental leave, tax-subsidized nursery daycare, 
preschool classes, and after-school classes are available for younger children (Nyberg 2012). The 
second strategy, providing a citizen’s pension to protect all elderly from poverty, is exemplified 
by the Netherlands. A state pension is available to all fulfilling a residency qualification, but as 
childcare is less available, Dutch women’s pensions are lower than their Danish equivalents due 
to the strengthening of occupation-related pensions (Frericks, Maier, and de Graaf 2006). The 
final strategy, sustaining a woman’s dependence on a male partner, is found in Germany under 
state-run Pay As You Go (PAYG) social insurance (Ebbinghaus and Whiteside 2012). This 
protects current German female retirees (Sefton, Evandrou, Falkingham, and Valchantoni 2011), 
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but recent pension reforms, reflecting a liberal turn, promote personal pension savings, as state 
protection is set to decline (Bridgen and Meyer 2014). Thus the Netherlands and Germany (and 
the UK) have the largest gender-derived pension gaps in the EU, while in the Nordic states, the 
problem is far less severe. 
 
 
THE LABOR MARKET IN AUSTRALIA 
 
The retirement system in Australia increasingly relies on individuals to save toward their 
retirement, thereby placing less expectation and reliance on state-funded pensions. It relies on 
workforce participation and is closely linked to labor market conditions. It is an important case 
due to the length of time it has focused on DCs and can offer important insights into the success 
of this approach for designing a self-funded pension system. Compared to OECD countries, 
Australian women overwhelmingly work in part-time (mostly very short hours), precarious, and 
low-paid jobs (Barns and Preston 2010; Cobb-Clark 2012; OECD 2017). Recent legislation 
designed to reduce gender inequalities in Australia include the Workplace Gender Equality Act 
(2012), which imposed benchmarked obligations on employers with one hundred staff or more, 
and the Fair Work Act (2009), which introduced flexible paid working hours for parents of 
preschool children and paid parental leave (Broderick 2012).2 Claims that superannuation 
perpetuates gendered labor market inequalities into retirement have been made (, Sheila Shaver 
2001; Susan Gee et al. 2002). An estimated gender earnings gap of 35 percent (Jefferson and 
Preston 2005) translates into a pension gap of 50 percent (Davis 2012 Clare 2014). The pension 
industry recommends the abolition of the lower minimum income hurdle for Superannuation 
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Guarantee contributions (currently set at AU$450 per month from a single employer) to 
accommodate more part-time or low-paid workers (Association of Superannuation Funds of 
Australia [ASFA] 2014). Such marginal improvements, however, will not get to the heart of the 
problem: women live longer and face retirement with lower retirement savings than men. 
Different rates of men’s and women’s employment and underemployment are 
contributing labor market factors in the gender gap in retirement savings. In 2001/02, some 78.1 
percent of Australian men and 60.3 percent of women (ages 20–74) were employed. By 2011/12, 
these averages had risen to 79.2 percent and 65.2 percent, respectively. Only 52.8 percent (76.3 
percent) of women with dependent children below age 5 (ages 6–14) were employed in 2006/07, 
compared to 94 percent (92 percent) of men. Fathers of dependent children are both more likely 
to work for pay and to work for pay full time compared to their partners. Notwithstanding the 
increase in employment rates of mothers over the past thirty years,3 mothers remain the primary 
childcare giver and many leave the labor force for extended periods, reducing their 
superannuation savings in an economically significant way. Similarly, informal care (for 
example, caring for a disabled spouse or adult relative) disproportionately falls on women, with 
financial and well-being consequences (van den Berg, Fiebig, and Hall 2014). Over and above 
total labor market absences, more women than men work for pay part time and consistently 
represent a greater share of underemployed workers (the underutilization of the productive 
capacity of the employed population). In 2001/02 (2011/12) 42.4 percent (43.2 percent) of 
women in the labor force were employed part time, compared to 11.1 percent (13.5 percent) of 
men. This gender difference interacts with the mandatory contributions rate, as it is only required 
if an individual earns more than AU$450 per month from the employer. Thus individuals who 
work for pay on a casual or part-time basis with multiple employers, the majority of which are 
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women, may not receive contributions even if they earn more than AU$450 per month in 
aggregate. 
This employment pattern is reflected in figures on men’s and women’s average paid 
working hours. Women work for pay fewer hours than men, whether employed full or part time, 
although the gap for full-time paid workers is more notable. The Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS; 2016) 2015 data confirm that, on average, men work for pay 5 hours longer per week than 
women. For part-time paid workers these figures are 17.2 (17.3) hours for men versus 16.4 (16.8) 
hours for women. These disparities, unsurprisingly, increase for parents of dependent children. 
The father of a preschool child working for pay full time (part time) averages 41.1 (18.6) hours 
per week compared to 32.3 (15.1) hours for mothers. Within both categories, therefore, longer 
hours probably translate into higher earnings (and retirement savings) for men than for women – 
thus creating future gaps in retirement balances. Cohort effects are evident in prior studies that 
have examined changes in Australian women’s labor market participation (Austen and Seymour 
2006), with increased participation with successive generations of women. Therefore, when 
documenting gender differences in retirement savings, it makes sense to also consider 
differences between age cohorts. 
A clear gender-based pay gap adds to the gender gap in retirement savings. Excluding 
managerial grades, the average hourly rate for men was AU$35.40 in 2012,4 compared to 
AU$31.20 for women. Accumulation rates for women, therefore, fall behind those for men. In 
2011/12, the average superannuation balance for men (age 15 and older) was AU$197,000 as 
compared to AU$105,000 for women (Clare 2014). This difference grows with age: the gender-
based balance gap in the 25–34 years age group (AU$25,859 for men versus AU$18,082 for 
women) increases in the retirement age group, aged 65–74 (AU$153,779 for men versus 
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AU$77,653 for women). Furthermore, some 34.6 percent of women aged over 15 years had no 
superannuation coverage in 2011/12, compared to 26.1 percent of men (Clare 2014). Younger 
(ages 15–24) and older (ages 65 and older) women were most likely to have no superannuation 
coverage. For younger women, this likely stems from participation in casual paid work, which 
often does not create sufficient income to attract Superannuation Guarantee payments. For older 
women, the legacy effect of part-time employment in the period prior to the Superannuation 
Guarantee, introduced in 1992, explains their lack of superannuation savings.  
 In summary, the situation in Australia bears marked similarities in regard to the low rates 
of retirement savings for women found elsewhere. Gender-based differences in labor force 
participation and the presence of dependent children affect women’s participation in waged work 
more than men’s. Women are also substantially more likely to be employed part-time and the 
number of hours employed, whether on a full- or part-time contract, is also lower for women in 
every age cohort. The current wage gap not only impacts women’s current spending abilities, but 
also their long-term consumption abilities due to the resulting retirement savings gap. While 
unemployment rates for men and women are similar, the underutilization rates for women are 
higher. Excluding professional classes, women receive lower hourly and weekly pay in each age 
cohort. While the associated impact on gender retirement savings is relatively small for cohorts 
in their early 20s, this gap is much larger (and very material) later in life.  
 
 
AUSTRALIAN RETIREMENT SAVINGS DATA 
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This paper uses administrative data from Mercer Australia to examine superannuation (pension) 
accumulation trends, tracking specific birth cohorts from 2002/03 to 2011/12. In 2012, the 
Mercer Super Trust (MST) had 260 participating employers and AU$15 billion in assets under 
management, making it one of the largest funds in the retail/corporate plan sector. The data cover 
employees drawn from a broad section of employers and offer a longitudinal perspective on 
patterns of superannuation accrual, allowing for a gender comparison over time. The transaction-
level data facilitate further analysis of gender differences by exploring birth cohorts’ contribution 
behaviors. 
Before proceeding to the analysis, we highlight some features of the data. First, 
information about members is limited to factors of direct concern to the management of the 
superannuation fund. While distinguishing fund members by age and gender, there is no 
information on marital status, parenthood, occupation, or savings outside superannuation. Annual 
income is proxied by the dollar amount of an employer’s contribution. In the context of the 
Australian system, this is a good proxy because the Superannuation Guarantee Act (SGA) 
mandates employers’ contributions at a fixed proportion of an employee’s earnings. Equally, a 
temporary absence from paid work, or a transfer to part-time paid work, can be deduced from 
changes in regularity or amount of contributions made on a member’s behalf. Members who 
cease employment can also be identified, as they are transferred into a separate personal division 
of the MST. Second, the analysis below focuses primarily on the experiences of different birth 
cohorts by gender. However, as mandatory superannuation was only introduced in 1992, this has 
implications for the balance of older women in the early years of the sample, as they were less 
likely to have been covered before that date (due to part-time paid work, for example). The 
system achieved a level of maturity in 2002/03, when mandatory contribution rates reached nine 
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percent and remain so for the remainder of the data period to 2011/12. Therefore, while the 
superannuation system has not fully matured, the period allows an analysis of early implications. 
Finally, the data presents an unbalanced panel with employees entering and leaving and with 
employers who also enter, and less commonly leave, the MST over the period. To reduce the 
influence of new members, this study restricts analysis to those who were in, or joined, the fund 
in 2002/03.  
A breakdown f the sample suggests a close match to population employment statistics in 
terms of the location and industry from which members are drawn. For example, comparing the 
2003 ABS (2003) employment data for a state breakdown versus the sample: New South Wales 
(NSW; 35 percent sample, 33 percent population); Victoria (28 percent, 25 percent); Queensland 
(13 percent, 19 percent); Western Australia (WA; 11 percent, 10 percent); South Australia (SA; 8 
percent, 8 percent). In terms of the industry breakdown, a less complete comparison is available. 
We compared employers within the MST where industry was available and compared with ABS 
data. Again, the data identifies the general comparability of the sample with the broader 
population. For example, comparing the 2003 industry breakdown (ABS 2004) of employed 
persons for the 25–34 and 35–44 years age groups: services (including financial; 29 percent of 
the sample, 35 percent of the population); transportation (4 percent, 5 percent); retail trade (20 
percent, 11 percent); and agricultural and mining (5 percent, 4 percent). 
 
 
COHORT SIZE AND ATTRITION 
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Given the consistently observed gender gap in savings at retirement, we are interested to trace 
how the differences emerge. In addition, we attempt to explore how the level and pattern of 
retirement savings contributions lead to this gap, as several channels are possible. First, there is a 
wide gender wage gap in Australia, and since contributions are tied to wages, women save less. 
Second, women often reduce paid work (for example, switching to part-time paid work or taking 
a career break) to meet caring needs, such as raising children, and make no retirement savings 
during this period. To explore these factors, we structure the analysis by examining three three-
year birth cohorts of members who were in the MST at the end of 2002/03: those ages 24–26 
years in the 2002/03 financial year (born in 1976–78), those 34–36 years (born in 1966–68), and 
those 44–46 years (born in 1956–58). Over the ten-year analysis, childcare needs would be 
substantially increased for women in the youngest cohort, reduced for women in the middle 
cohort, and stabilized for women in the eldest cohort. 
Figure 1 provides a breakdown of the initial sample of 21,499 members by gender, birth 
cohort, and financial year. There are more male members in each birth cohort, with the elder 
cohorts substantially so, reflecting gender differences in labor participation at older ages. 
Attrition, as it relates to this study, refers to an exit from the fund, not the labor market. The 
attrition in the sample is high, with only 6,669 members remaining in MST by the end of the ten-
year window. Among the birth cohorts, the youngest cohort has the highest attrition rate, 
indicating greater labor mobility. For each birth cohort in the sample, the propensity for women 
to leave the MST is higher than that for men. 
<Insert Figure 1 > 
High attrition rates pose an issue for our analysis if they are substantially different by 
gender. Members may switch jobs due to low current salary levels, and we investigate if the 
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proportion of women in low-contribution quartiles changes over time. Panel A of Figure 2 shows 
the proportion of women in each of the contribution quartiles in each financial year. A member is 
classified into a contribution quartile within her own birth cohort based on the first observed full 
financial year of contributions.5 Among all birth cohorts, the proportion of women in the 
majority of contribution quartiles is stable over time, suggesting that women are not 
underrepresented in later observation periods. Another factor that could differentially impact 
attrition is wealth, where, similarly, low-wealth individuals may be more likely to switch jobs. 
Similar to contributions, Panel B indicates that member attrition is not biased toward a particular 
gender over the ten-year period. As a further robustness check, a balanced sample was also used 
to investigate the research question. The results are similar; hence, results from the unbalanced 
sample are reported here. 
<Ins rt Figure 2> 
 
 
RETIREMENT SAVINGS ACCUMULATION AND DISTRIBUTIONS 
 
Balance distribution between genders 
 
All three cohorts had substantial growth in account balances over the ten-year period. The 
youngest birth cohort, coming from a low-balance base, had the highest growth of almost 750 
percent in median balances, jumping from AU$7,527 to AU$56,415. The oldest birth cohort, 
starting from a substantially higher balance of AU$67,324, had their median balance tripled to 
AU$202,681. The gender balance gap exists from very early on and continues over time. The 
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youngest cohort had a gap of AU$1,142 in 2002/03 (AU$5,674 versus AU$6,816), while the 
oldest had a gap of AU$21,889 (AU$20,184 versus AU$42,073). At the same time, men’s 
balances had higher growth than women’s, broadening the gap for the youngest cohort to 
AU$18,608 (AU$43,158 versus AU$61,766) and AU$81,769 (AU$90,266 versus AU$171,995) 
for the oldest in 2011/12. The changes are a result of the combined effect from contributions to 
the superannuation, investment returns, and taxes and fees charged. Jun Feng and Paul Gerrans 
(2014) have shown that the majority of superannuation members rely on the default contribution 
level and investment option. Therefore, employer contributions to superannuation will drive 
gender gaps in balances. 
Figure 3 details the gender balance gap for each birth cohort separately for each 
contribution quartile. Overall, the gender balance gap increases over time for all birth cohorts 
and contribution quartiles. Young members (24–26 years and 34–36 years cohorts) in the lower 
contribution quartiles had modest gender differences initially, which widen slightly over the 
period. Older members (44–46 years cohort) had a sizable gap at the beginning of the period, 
which continued to widen over time. Thus, the gender balance gap increased statistically 
significantly. Members in the highest contribution quartile exhibit the largest gender balance gap. 
Further t-tests suggest that for lower contribution quartiles, only the oldest cohort had a 
significant balance difference from the very beginning, with the middle and younger cohorts not 
having statistically significant differences until five years later. Meanwhile, disparity existed for 
all cohorts in the highest contribution quartile from 2002/03 and continued through the 
observation period. 
<Insert Figure 3> 
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Over the ten-year period, the gender balance gap reduced during 2007/08 to 2009/10, 
reflecting the impact of external events, namely the GFC. Notably, in the oldest cohort, a 
narrowing of the gender balance gap was observed, in part, reflecting that those with larger 
balances fared relatively worse in the GFC. Sarah Holden et al. (2013) have shown that for 
younger 401(k) account holders with smaller balances, annual contributions dominated balance 
declines experienced through the GFC. In contrast, for older account holders with larger balances, 
their annual contributions were unable to recover their account declines. An analysis of labor 
market data also suggests a differential impact as the unemployment rate increased from 3.7 (3.6) 
percent for men (women) in August 2008 to 6.1 (6.0) percent in June 2009 (ABS 2016). Finally, 
a comparison of men that exited the MST in 2008/09 reveals they had lower mean balances than 
their female counterparts, suggesting it was lower (higher) income men (women) that were laid 
off at this time. 
A few extremely high balances can skew average balances. Therefore, we further 
examine the whole distribution of balances and formally test differences in balance distributions 
by gender. Figure 4 presents the comparison between birth cohorts from 2002/03 (adjusted to 
equivalent 2011/12 values) with themselves in 2011/12. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms 
differences in the balance distributions, with men having higher accumulations than women, 
although the balance density for women coheres at higher levels among older birth cohorts. In 
other words, the distribution of women’s balances for every birth cohort is lower (with more 
density to the left reflecting lower balances). The difference is most obvious for the 44–46 years 
cohort. Repeating the comparison for the surviving (non-exited) members in 2011/12 shows that 
the differences in distributions are larger in 2011/12 than in 2002/03.  
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Balance inequality 
 
The analysis so far has concentrated on distributional outcomes to shed light on the unequal 
accumulations in superannuation savings. To further explore the distributional differences in 
superannuation savings, we explore a number of inequality measures to provide a picture of 
differences both within and between genders, as well as from a single time point and taking into 
account the time structure. 
The first inequality measure used is the Gini index (Paglin 1975; Deininger and Squire 
1996), which ranks the distribution of balances, or contributions, and compares the cumulative 
proportion of total sums with the cumulative proportion of the number of members. If 10 percent 
of the members own 10 percent of the total balance, there would be an equal distribution. Here 
the measure is used to examine within the genders to see if the distribution is more or less 
equally distributed. Panel A of Figure 5 shows the Gini index for each cohort over years. Of 
most interest is the relative position of each gender and the relative inequality between birth 
cohorts. The figure suggests that there is an overall reduction in wealth inequality within gender 
over the period, albeit the youngest cohort saw an increase in inequality in later years. In most of 
the years, wealth inequality is slightly higher among women; however, this difference is 
overwhelmed by differences across birth cohorts. Wealth inequality is the greatest among the 
oldest cohort and lowest among the youngest, indicating a cumulative effect where inequality 
worsens as one ages. 
<Insert Figure 5> 
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The cross-section snapshot of inequality by year according to the Gini index can be 
overly influenced by wealth in a particular year. The worsening of wealth inequality 
accompanied by aging can be a result of rich people getting richer and poor people getting poorer 
without changing their relative position in a distribution. Therefore, we also utilize a mobility 
index to measure movements in distributions to examine how likely a member will move up or 
down the wealth distribution. Anthony F. Shorrocks’s (1978) R mobility measure with the Gini 
index is used to quantify the proportion of inequality measured over a sub-period – here, 
annually – which persists over the longer-term period. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 
indicating no mobility or rigid inequality. Figure 6 presents the mobility index for wealth and 
contributions over the observation period. Each of the data points represents the mobility index 
estimate of a balanced sample of survivors remaining in MST at the end of the financial year.  
Panel A of Figure 6 shows the mobility index for wealth distribution. The higher the 
value, the greater the mobility. Consistent with the Gini index, there is an increasing mobility 
trend over time. Mobility is greatest for the youngest cohort, reflecting greater movement up and 
down the balance distribution. Also, mobility is generally greater for women, though this is 
relative to other women within the birth cohort. Note that the largest gender gap is evident for the 
youngest birth cohort, reflecting a high degree of volatility in the distribution of their 
superannuation balances, which is reduced for the 34–36 years cohort and nearly disappears for 
the oldest cohort. 
<Insert Figure 6> 
The within-gender analysis allowed us to examine the dynamics among members of the 
same gender. We now seek to identify inequality between genders by investigating whether 
female (male) members are overrepresented in the lower or upper sections of wealth distribution. 
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To do so, all members are pooled, sorted, and ranked by member balance at the end of each 
financial year. Next, we assign each member a percentile ranking from 1 to 100, where a ranking 
of 1 (100) represents a balance in the bottom (top) 1 percentile of all members. To examine the 
relative position of female and male members, we then sum the percentiles separately and 
calculate the average percentile. Finally, the ratio of female average percentile to male average 
percentile is estimated: the closer this value is to 1, the closer the average percentile ranking of 
men and women. Both the level and trend in this ratio are of interest. 
The trend revealed in Panel A of Figure 7 suggests that the average ranking decreases for 
female members relative to male members for each birth cohort. The average ranking is closest 
to a value of 1 (where male and female balance percentile rankings are almost equal) for the 
youngest cohort and furthest apart for the oldest. The dip and subsequent improvement in female 
to male percentile balance rank for the 44–46 cohort in 2010/11 and 2011/12 corresponds to the 
exit of a group of relatively higher balance women in 2010/11. 
 
 
LABOR FORCE FACTORS AS A CONTRIBUTOR TO GENDER RETIREMENT SAVINGS 
GAP 
 
In what follows, we undertake an analysis to investigate whether gender-based differences in 
labor market conditions are observed within the MST data. We make use of the fact that because 
the mandatory employer contributions for paid workers are a fixed percentage of wages in 
Australia, they provide an excellent proxy for earnings. 
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Wage gap and inequality 
 
The previous discussion of Panel A in Figure 2 showed that men are overrepresented in the two 
highest contributions quartiles for each birth cohort. The distribution is least dispersed in the 
youngest cohort and most dispersed for the oldest cohort. Given that a large proportion of men 
receive higher contributions and from younger ages, the power of compounding is expected to 
magnify into larger balance differences over time. 
Mobility in earnings, despite being greater than in wealth (Headey, Marks, and Wooden 
2005), is limited. Inequality in contributions when measured within gender (Panel B, Figure 5) is 
generally smaller than in wealth. The Gini index for contributions/earnings is relatively stable for 
all cohorts except the youngest group of women. Similar to the pattern for wealth distribution, 
the mobility index suggests that it is those within the youngest cohorts who are more likely to 
move up and down the earnings distribution (Panel B, Figure 6). Average women’s 
contributions/earnings are always lower than men’s in the data – female member rankings, on 
average, are lower than male rankings for all cohorts, as shown in Panel B of Figure 7. While the 
disparity in earnings is relatively stable in the older cohorts, for the youngest cohort, there is a 
sharp increase in the disparity of earnings. This persistence in the earnings/contributions gap 
feeds into the retirement savings gap. 
<Insert Figure 7> 
 
 
Labor force interruptions 
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In addition to differences in earnings levels, labor force interruptions also play a role. As noted, 
women are predominantly the caregivers, whether for children, a spouse, or adult family 
members, necessitating time off from paid work in the form of reduced paid working hours or 
not working for pay for a period of time. We consider a number of definitions for labor force 
interruptions as they manifest in contributions records. First, we identify instances of a reduction 
in the level of employer contributions as a proxy for changes in the number of hours worked for 
pay. Second, we analyze instances of a reduction in the number of employer contributions made 
in a year as a proxy for changes in employment patterns. Absence from paid work, or switching 
to casual paid work, can lead to a reduction in contribution frequencies. Third, we identify those 
members who remain employed but do not receive any employer contributions for a financial 
year as a final measure of employment interruption. The three panels of Figure 8 present these. 
Panel A indicates that prior to the GFC, women in the two youngest cohorts were more 
likely to have interruptions, indicated by a reduction in mean contributions. The difference is not 
observed for the 44–46 years cohort. This pattern coincides with data that indicates that the late 
20s and early 30s are the most common age for becoming a mother in Australia (Australian 
Institute of Family Studies 2018). Panel B indicates a similar pattern, though more evident for 
the 24–26 years cohort. The pattern of a higher proportion of female members having a reduction 
in the frequency of contributions extends to the mid 30s but is again not evident in the 44–46 
years cohort. Panel C indicates that a rising trend over the period is observed for those missing a 
full year of contributions. This parallels the overall attrition rates, but whereas attrition is based 
on members being classified as exited, here members remain in the fund (and with the employer) 
but are absent a full year. It is likely that these members transition to being an exited member. 
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Again, the proportion is consistently higher for female members, though the differences for the 
oldest cohort are not apparent until post-GFC. 
<Insert Figure 8> 
 
 
FUTURE OUTLOOK ON THE GENDER BALANCE GAP: COMPARING AGE COHORTS 
 
Patterns discovered through the birth-cohort analysis prompt the question of whether the pattern 
holds for other birth cohorts. We start with an investigation into the distribution of wealth for 
members of the same age at two different points in time. Panel A of Figure 9 compares the 
experience for two of the age cohorts: those 24–26 years and 44–46 years in 2002/03 compared 
with their same-age peers in 2011/12. For the youngest age cohort, for both men and women, 
inflation adjusted balances are marginally lower in 2011/12 than for their 2002/03 counterparts. 
In real terms, they appear worse off, possibly reflecting GFC impacts on earnings and paid work 
opportunities of the young. For the 44–46 years age groups, the 2011/12 cohort are better off 
than their same-age group a decade earlier. Despite this, the gap between men and women 
remains. Panel B of Figure 9 suggests that there is a small improvement in gender balance 
inequality for each age cohort. The average percentile ranking for women’s balance improves 
marginally relative to men over the period, although more so for the older cohorts. 
Notwithstanding, inequality remains, with men’s rankings, on average, higher than female 
member rankings for each of the cohorts. In terms of contributions, a similar level of gender 
inequality is persistent for all three age cohorts. The comparisons in Panel B of Figure 9 suggest 
that it is unlikely that the gender balance gap is going to close in the near future. 
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<Insert Figure 9> 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
We use a longitudinal data sample drawn from members of a major Australian superannuation 
provider, which covers employees from a wide cross-section of employers and industries, to 
explore labor market factors that contribute to lower retirement savings balances for women in 
Australia. The data allow an examination of the consequences of pension policies and labor 
market conditions that interact to generate lower savings outcomes for women. The Australian 
experience offers an insight for those at earlier stages of designing self-funded pension systems.  
What has the data told us? First, across many measures, men’s and women’s outcomes 
are rarely the same. This highlights the structural features of employment-based DC schemes that 
generate a gender gap, which, as many surveys indicate, undermine the chances of women being 
able to generate the same retirement savings as men. Our results provide some empirical support 
to the simulations conducted by Jefferson and Preston (2005) regarding the projected gendered 
gap in retirement savings. Second, in exploring the sources of this discrepancy, the data show 
that substantial savings gaps occur early in paid working life, largely attributable to gaps in 
younger women’s contribution records; contribution gaps seem less evident among older age 
cohorts, but this may be due to larger numbers of older women leaving paid work (and, 
therefore, the sample) altogether. This pattern, reflecting those observed in employment data, 
supports the view that younger women leave paid work, or move to part-time or casual paid 
work, during the years of family formation. This is supported by the higher levels of 
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contributions interruptions and irregularity. Third, the decision to work part time, or take career 
breaks in early paid working life, appears to affect future income in an adverse way. The gender 
distribution of men and women in our contributions-based earnings quartiles demonstrates how 
older men increasingly dominate the higher earnings groups, although we have to be careful here 
as these figures represent the earnings of different cohorts, and the experience of older women 
cannot be transposed back as an assumed future for younger cohorts. 
Our data show that, through the first decade of the twenty-first century in Australia, 
changing balances and contribution distributions demonstrate a clear relative deterioration for 
women in their later 20s and early 30s. This indicates that career breaks and part-time paid work 
remain the strategy of choice for coping with family caring responsibilities, and that women are 
the parents who undertake this. This means that, in early paid working life, the flow of 
contributions into retirement savings slows or stops temporarily. This has two major 
consequences. First, as widely acknowledged, a return to full-time paid work in one’s mid 40s 
stabilizes the interrelationship between men’s and women’s contribution rates, but the damage in 
terms of foregone wages and associated retirement savings in their own account has already been 
done, and women’s balances are much lower. Moreover, this gap might also be explained by the 
evidence that women who do return to full-time paid work in their 40s probably have lower 
incomes relative to those who leave the labor market permanently. Second, the retirement 
savings balances for older women are impacted due to less regular contribution flows – and the 
compound returns accruing to lower balances in mid-career exacerbate the gap between men’s 
and women’s super savings, which expands over the final years before retirement, both in a 
statistically and economically meaningful way. The care penalty exerted on women’s income 
security in retirement has long been – and remains – peculiarly marked. Little evidence appears 
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in our data to suggest that, thanks to changing employment patterns among younger generations 
of women, this situation will solve itself in time. On the contrary, there is every reason to 
suppose that for the next half-century or more, Australian women without the support of a spouse 
will continue to rely overwhelmingly on the age pension. This study contributes to the literature 
on gendered gaps in retirement outcomes by providing empirical longitudinal evidence of the 
consequences of labor market factors on retirement savings outcomes in Australia, particularly 
for women. We provide evidence of the importance of the labor market in Australia in generating 
a statistically significant economic disadvantage for women over time. 
Much of the recent response to gender inequalities in pension savings has been to 
encourage women to save more. In Australia, for instance, this is advocated through means such 
as salary sacrifice or by taking advantage of the state supplements that the Commonwealth 
government offers low-income workers. Women live longer, the argument runs, so must save 
more in order to guarantee that their funds do not fall short of their needs in later life (Rice 
Warner 2014). This is an inadequate response, which will not bridge the gap revealed here. As 
Feng and Gerrans (2014) note, fewer women are choosing the tax-advantaged pre-tax savings 
options. More constructive suggestions involve including contributions from maternity pay in the 
Super Guarantee, but this only offers a very partial compensation (ASFA 2014). Our findings 
echo the concerns of others who have examined women’s retirement savings (Fernández-López 
et al.2015) and those who advocate for the need for these factors to be considered in the context 
of public pension schemes for women.  
Other factors, however, also threaten the future of Australian superannuation. The Lucky 
Country has enjoyed nearly thirty years of prosperity, relatively full employment, and good 
returns on invested funds. However, there are indications that the years of prosperity be over, 
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that new entrants into the scheme are not attaining the savings of their older siblings, and that the 
GFC may have exerted a greater influence than previously supposed on jobs for young people 
and thus on their savings for the future (for the European experience, see Karl Hinrichs and 
Matteo Jessoula [2012]). Further research will be able to verify this conclusion in a more 
definitive way, but future safeguards will be needed if this type of personal savings system is 
going to offer a viable and secure retirement for all Australian citizens. 
Finally, our study has several limitations. First, the nature of the data is such that it does 
not contain all of the information that would be helpful for us to analyze, such as information on 
marital status, parenthood, occupation, or savings outside of one’s current superannuation fund. 
Although Australia seems to experience the same types of gendered differences in retirement 
outcomes that we see elsewhere, one must be wary when generalizing the labor market factors 
and subsequent outcomes to other environments.  
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Figure 1 Sample profile by gender, birth cohort, and financial year 
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Figure 2 Gender composition by contribution quartiles and wealth quartiles 
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Figure 3 Difference in mean balance by contribution quartiles 
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Figure 4 Balance distributions for birth cohorts 2002/03 vs. 2011/12 (kernel density estimates) 
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Figure 5 Gini index within gender and birth cohort 
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Figure 6 Mobility Index within gender and birth cohort 
 
Figure 7 Inequality indices by birth cohort 
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Figure 8 Contribution interruptions 
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Figure 9 Inequality indices by age cohort 
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NOTES 
 
                                                 
1 Superannuation savings can be accessed earlier depending on date of birth. The earliest is age 
55 for those born before July 1, 1960 and increases to age 60 for those born on or after July 1, 
1964. Withdrawals are only tax free from age 60. 
2 However, the practical difference of the act has been questioned (Natalie J. Skinner, Claire 
Hutchinson, and Barbara Pocock 2013). 
3 For example, as Jennifer Baxter (2013) highlights, the employment rate for mothers has 
increased from 55 percent in 1991 to 65 percent in 2011, though disproportionately in part-time 
paid work. 
4 For comparison, through 2012, which is the final year of our data, the AUD traded at a slight 
premium to the USD, and the AUD was worth approximately €0.80.  
5 Unless a member joins on the first day of the financial year, their total contributions need to be 
annualized. Given that not all individuals are employed on the same frequency of contributions, 
extrapolating from a small number of observations can provide an inaccurate estimate, and we, 
therefore, use full financial years (July 1 to June 30) to avoid these issues. 
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